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Abstract: This paper sheds some light on the possible implications of compensations
which are paid for the maintenance of an environmental stock. It shows that
serious complications can arise if the resource-owner can vary the
compensation price. In that case, extraction-driven stock preservation
policies can conflict with compensation-driven ones and imply instability.
Whether compensation policies can neglect this aspect depends crucially on
the credibility of sticky compensation prices (JEL Classification: D 43, Q
20).
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This paper sheds some light on the possible implications of compensations which are
paid for the maintenance of an environmental stock. International compensations for
environmental purposes are still in their infancies and the resources devoted to
encourage the protection of globally beneficial environmental resources are restricted
on project support. But this project support is criticized as an insufficient and
inefficient instrument to avoid environmentally harmful repercussions of resource
extractions. In addition to the well-known arguments for the need of North-South-
compensations, compensations for mere preservation seem to gain increasing political
support because they can seemingly guarantee preservation in a very cost-effective
manner.
1
This paper will demonstrate that the optimism surrounding these approaches is far
from convincing when compensations are paid for the maintenance of environmental
stocks and the donators are not able to stick credibly to a constant compensation price.
Without claiming to cover all scenarios of international compensation policies, I will
discuss severe complications which are closely related to monopolistic pricing margins
of resource-owners. Because preserving globally beneficial environmental stocks is
basically a matter of long-run policies, the paper addresses stability aspects more
explicitly than static approaches do. The models which I use in this paper are fairly
simple and employ optimal control theory. The paper is organized as follows. Section
2 demonstrates the superiority of steady payments in a static setting. Section 3
compares the optimal policies of a resource-owning country without and with a
constant compensation price paid per maintained unit of stock. Section 4 addresses
compensation policies when the compensation price is not fixed but can be varied by
the resource owner. Section 5 concludes the paper.
This paper concentrates on aspects of compensation policies on the* policies of
resource-owning countries. It neglects aspects of fund-raising and assumes that the
benefiting countries are willing to endow a specific environmental fund or that an
international environmental agency is able to tax these countries. Although the already
existing Global Environmental Facilities give some evidence that the benefiting
countries are prepared to pay for preservation, the need for a rapidly increasing budget
for compensation purposes increases the incentives to ride free. However, strategic
aspects of fund-raising are beyond the scope of this paper.
1 For a thorough discussion of financial instruments, see NUNNENKAMP (1992) and the quoted literature
there.2. Compensations and Sovereignty Constraints
The agents who receive compensations in an international setting are sovereign
countries. If compensations are paid in advance, no authority is able to enforce the
agreed-upon environmental services for which the compensations are paid.
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Consequently, no country is able to commit itself credibly not to breach an
international environmental contract. Because both donator and receiver anticipate this
institutional deficiency, the sovereignty constraint demands the contract to be self-
enforcing, i.e. the receiver must be not worse off by sticking to the agreement than by
breaching it. In a world of certainty, this condition can only be met if the
compensation game is repeated infinitely.
3
The large body of literature (e.g. FRIEDMAN, 1971, FUDENBERG, MASKIN, 1986)
justifies to adopt a very simple approach here in order to stress the basic idea of steady
compensations. Assume that a donator exhibits a willingness-to-pay q per unit of
environmental services. Let ,S denote these services which originate from the
corresponding preservation which surmounts the receiver's voluntary efforts. The
receiver has to decide whether she will stick to the agreement and carry the extra costs
C(G), C(0)=0, Ca, Cac > 0, or whether she will breach the contract immediately after
she has received the compensations. The donator punishes a contract breach by
offering compensations never again. The time which elapses between potential offers
is denoted by h and future benefits and costs are discounted by the annual discount rate
r. Any contract which lays o' down has to satisfy the compliance constraint
•^ CJG'— C(o') cjo' — C(CT') / ,s
(1) 7 = >C(CJ )
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The LHS of (1) mirrors the net benefits from sticking to the agreement which consist
of the periodical benefits beginning one period later (qa' is paid anyway in the first
period). Hence, the discounted future benefits must not fall short from the
instantaneous cost savings C{a') of the non-compliance option. (1) potentially restricts
the joint maximization of benefits
(2) max[qS-C(S)] s.t. (1).
2 See for the basic dilemma of self-enforcing international environmental agreements BARRETT
(1992).
3 According to KRKPS, MlLGROM, ROBERTS, WILSON (1982), information asymmetries can be
helpful to set the stage for temporary cooperation in a finitely repeated game.According to the Kuhn-Tucker-Theorem with A as the (non-negative) shadow price of
(1), I obtain the solution
(3)
If the compliance constraint does not bind, i.e. X = 0 for the unconstrained optimal a,
full cooperation will emerge. But if r is high enough, both face a positive A. Because
(2) is concave in a, they can try to find a lower positive preservation level which just
meets the compliance constraint.
If h is not fixed, the compliance constraint never applies through a sufficient reduction
of h. An h approaching zero lets the compliance constraint vanish because the payment
occurs at the very moment of the fulfilment of the contract. Hence, paying steadily
provides us with an option which avoids severe compliance problems.
4 If the donator
is able to monitor the degree of environmental services instantaneously, even an
explicit contract is superfluous. From this perspective, all the donator needs is an
account number, a sufficient monitoring technique and a consistent pricing rule. The
need for a monitoring technique does not raise serious problems because modern
satellite techniques are very successful in monitoring even very small-scale outdoor
regions. E.g., the verification of the size of tropical forests and the evaluation of
corresponding stock-dependent payments seems to be a comparably easy task. It is
these stock-dependent services and two sets of pricing rules on which I focus in the
remainder.
3. The Basic Model of Compensating for Environmental Stocks
The resource-owner is assumed to derive utility from a global environmental stock
only via extractions, i.e. the environmental stock services accrue solely to the donator.
Let B denote the net benefits from extractions E,
Steady payments are not the only instrument available to achieve stable international
environmental agreements. E.g., MOHR and THOMAS (1993) discuss the stabilizing effect of
cross-default clauses between environmental and credit contacts. STAHLER (1992) discusses the
stabilizing role of in-kind-transfers to compensate non-compliant agents.(4) []EEEEEE E
£-»0
The resource owner faces positive, marginally decreasing net benefits from
extractions. Extractions are neither necessary nor essential resource inputs into
production which induces nonTinfinite marginal net benefits. The environmental
resource is exhaustible and renewable which is mirrored by the regeneration function
which depends on the stock:
(5)
0(5 < S
m:R* > 0, lim R,(S) = °°
S
m(S<S°:Rs(0, limRs(S)>-oo
(5) defines a fairly convenient regeneration function.
6 Assuming an infinite limit for a
stock approaching zero ensures that every real positive number can be assigned to the
first derivative of a stock which belongs to the range of positive regeneration. Due to
the assumption of no directly stock-dependent benefits, the dynamic problem
resembles the one of optimal fishery (see CLARK, 1976, DASGUPTA, HEAL, 1979).
Assume that the planning horizon is infinite and that the resource-owner discounts the
future by the time-invariant discount rate r. Without compensations, the maximization
problem of a resource-owning country is given by
(6) max je'
rlB(t)dt s.t. S = R(t)-E(t)
BFEE = 0 is only met by a quadratic benefit function and shows up as a convenient assumption
for the stability of the solution in this section's model. See footnote 8. Partial differentiations
are denoted by a respective subscript whereas differentiations with respect to time are denoted
by a dot. Throughout the paper, 1 suppress the time index whenever suitable.
Especially the infinite limit of the marginal regeneration for the zero stock will show up to save
an interior solution even if the discount rate is very high. Note that a conventional logistic
function cannot catch the corresponding properties of the regeneration function because it
assumes a finite limit for the zero stock. To present an example, the simple circle function







 ss R(S) [R(S)f
produces infinite limits for 5 = 0 and S = S°. Note also that the second derivative of this
function is indeed negative, whereas the third derivative can be shown to depend on the stock.and the respective initial stock. The corresponding current-value Hamiltonian Hc is
given by
(7) Hc=B(t) + X(t){R(t)-E(t)}
Rewriting the optimality condition and substituting for the costate variable gives
(8) BEEE = BE[r-Rs]






e and a describe the implicit functions for the steady state equations. Partial












The partial derivatives of a, i.e.
°S=
RS
complete the definition of the Jacobi matrix J and allow for the local stability analysis.
The trace and the determinant of J,
B EE
show that the steady state is a saddle point. Figure 1 reveals the stable branches on
which a convergence to the steady state is guaranteed. Because there is no restriction
7 The infinitely positive limit of the zero stock ensures an interior solution. If instead
lim Rs (S) = i(<>° holds, the resource will be completely extincted if r>i.on E which means that E can jump on a stable branch immediately, the potential
instability of the saddle point does not impose a serious problem. For any given initial
stock, there exists exactly one extraction level to start with which lies on the "yellow
brick road" to the steady state.
<Figure 1 about hero
Now assume that a donator exists who is willing to pay g[S(0] for the preservation of
the stock from which he benefits by the arising global environmental services. The
steady stream of payments £)[S(0] changes the benefits of the receiver which now also
depend on the stock. Hence, he optimizes according to
(10) max \e~
rt{B{t) + Q[S(t)]}dt s.t. S = R(S)-E(t).
o
The corresponding Hamiltonian is given by
: (11) Hc = B{t) + Q[S(t)] + n(t){R(t) - E(t)}.
Applying the Maximum Principle demands the Arrow Sufficiency Condition to be
fulfilled:
I will assume that (12) will always hold. It can be easily demonstrated, however, that
compensating for the provision of a necessary or even essential environmental
resource can induce corner solution if 2[S(/)] mirrors the marginal willingness-to-pay.
Whether compensation policies aim at tackling a problem of an essential or necessary
environmental resource stock depends crucially on the availability of a backstop
technology (NORDHAUS, 1973). If substitution of the stock services is possible for
finite costs, I can assume without significant loss of generality that the condition
spelled out in (12) is valid in the whole relevant range. After rewriting the optimality
conditions and substituting for the costate variable, I obtain
(13) BEl,.E = B,[r-Rs]-Qs.
This section focuses on a constant compensation price q which is paid per unit of stock
and which the donator does not modify after compensations are introduced. The
donator is assumed to stick credibly to this constant price forever. For this set ofcompensation policies, Qg is simply given by the constant compensation price q and
demands for the change of extractions
(14) BEEE=BE[r-Rs]-q.
(15) describes the steady state:
• _BE[r-Rs]-qi_ _ „
(15)
















When E approaches zero, a zero change in extractions is guaranteed according to (14)
by an R§ which falls short from r as long as BE(E = 0)(°°. Hence, the isocline E = 0
starts on the RHS of the old one and increases in E as S increases. Due to the
ambiguous sign of Rsss (
se
e Footnote 6), nothing is known about the concrete
curvature on purely theoretical grounds. The local stability analysis of the
corresponding Jacobi matrix reveals a positive trace of J but the evaluation of the
determinant's sign seems to be ambiguous, therefore signalling potential local
instability:
= r,\J\=[r-Rs]Rs- BEE
However, it is easily demonstrated that the saddle point attributes remain valid. A
positive determinant | J | which would induce global instability demands a positive Rg
at the equilibrium. Hence, instability should be given if
dE
BEE[r-Rs] dS E=QThis instability condition conflicts with the path properties which I have derived above
because a concave regeneration function cannot intersect an always increasing
function at a point of larger inclination when the other function starts on the RHS of
the regeneration function.
8 Figure 2 shows the phase diagram for a policy which aims
at a long-run preservation of a stock that produces a negative marginal regeneration.
<Figure 2 about hero
This result could be rather helpful for politicians because the preservation of any stock
belonging to the range of positive regeneration can be obtained in the long run.
4. A Price Adjustment Model of Compensating for Environmental
Stocks
Section 3 assumed that the donator is a Stackelberg leader who sticks credibly to a
constant compensation price q. To suppose a donator who is able to create such a
commitment machine which works infinitely is no weak assumption. If the donator is
not able to introduce such a rigid compensation mechanism, resource-owners will take
into account that their stock decisions are able to vary the compensation price.
Observing that the resource-owning countries are often only few in number justifies an
approach which takes imperfections into account.
Consider the resource owner which knows that her stock decisions vary the
compensations according to
(16) q(l)S{t) = [a- bS(t)]S(t), S™* = ^-
9
b
Now it is evident that BEEE = 0 is a very convenient assumption for the stability of this
problem because it guarantees an always positive e'E=r-Rs. If BEEE)0, e'E must be
supplemented by
This term causes ambiguity with respect to the sign of £E except in a sufficiently narrow
neighborhood around £* where the term vanishes due to the optimality condition. Hence, a
non-zero 5m:does nol endanger local stability but global one because stable branches may not
exist when the agent is far away from the steady state.
Alternatively, one could model oligopolistic interactions more explicitely by considering n
identical countries. In that case, the compensation price would be given by
5>
But the reintepretation of several regeneration functions is not straightforward and one has to
take possible collusion among resource owners into account, too. Hence, this section(16) sets the stage for the other set of compensation policies which may be based on an
international institution like a supranational environmental agency which, e.g.,
compensates the resource-owners on the basis of marginal utilities.
1
0 It could be
imagined as possessing tax-raising power to cover its expenses. This approach may
mirror reality more appropriately than Section 3's model because it can approximate
the institutional setting of an environmental fund whose members revaluate the
success and the "appropriate" compensation price periodically according to (16).
n The
parameter a can be considered as a proxy for the costs of the backstop technology
which defines the reservation price for compensations. The parameter b determines the
degree of "stickiness" which is felt by the resource owner. The lower b, the higher is
the effect of the stock size on the compensation price.
The maximization problem changes for the resource-owner into '
(17) maxje-
rt{U(t) + [a-bS(t)]S(t)}dt s.t. S = R(S)-E(t),
o
and the respective initial stock. The new Hamiltonian is given by
(18) Hc = B(t) + [a -bS(t)]S(t) + y(t){R(S) -E(t)}.
Rewriting the optimally condition and substituting for the costate variable gives
(19) BEEE=BE[r-Rs]-[a-2bS].
The steady state conditions are
- - BE[r-Rs]-[a-2bS]in t, = =u
(20)
 BEE
S = R(t)-E(t) = 0
concentrates on the same resource owner and the compensation function should be regarded as
a perceived demand function of this resource owner. This perceived demand function can
mirror Cournot oligopoly or collusion.
Whether these utilities are Lindahl-based or imperfect marginal willingncss-to-pay-measures is
not considered here.
The assumption of discrete jumps merely complicates the analysis and docs not add new
insights. Unless the receiving countries can manipulate the jump by additional means besides
their stock decisions, the problem remains the same in qualitative terms. Sec for the role of
jumps in optimal control theory SEIERSTAD, SYDSAETER (1987).10
Now, equalizing BE[r-Rs] and a-2W> is much more complex than in the case of
fixed prices because the stock does not only enter the regeneration function but the









If r -Rs is positive for the whole relevant range, imperfections imply a mere decrease
in services as one expects from static models, too. One could tolerate this deviation as
an unavoidable imperfection which is accepted as the performance of many industrial
markets, too. But the positive sign of r - Rs is not guaranteed. Let S stand for the stock
that meets the E = 0-curve at an extraction level of zero. 5 is implicitly defined by
(22) [r - Rs (s)JBE (0) = a- 2bS.
To balance both terms, S'is not limited to produce only a positive r-Rs. The sign of
the LHS of (22) is determined by the marginal biological regeneration and the discount
rate which define the net interest. The RHS displays the conventional marginal yield
which arises in a competitively imperfect environment. If
(23) Rs(s))r<*a-2bS(Q
holds, equajizing both terms leads to negative signs. In this case, (21) induces a
negative slope of the isocline. Hence, (23) is a necessary and sufficient condition for a
negatively sloped E = 0-curve.
Before addressing stability aspects, some economics on this point are helpful. If (23) is
valid, the resource owner has to operate in a range of stocks which conflicts with her
conventional monopolistic plans. To meet the steady state condition (20), she must
supply a stock which is beyond her maximum yield. Her discount factor and the
biology induce her to aim at a stock which lies in the range of a perceived demand
elasticity which surmounts -1. From the perspective of compensations, she should
keep a lower stock, but from the perspective of her extraction policy, she should keep
a higher one. This shows that market imperfections can set incentives to hold a lower
stock than a resource-owner would like to hold voluntarily.The RHS of (23) reflects the marginal yield of the resource owner and the LHS can be
considered as her marginal costs which are due to the net interest weighted by the
marginal benefits of extractions. If (23) applies, the resource owner must outweigh the
marginal costs and the marginal yields in the negative domain. The net interest of the
stock which is determined by the discount rate and the biology of the resource does not
fit in with the exploitation of the donator's willingness-to-pay. Hence, imperfections
can produce an obviously unstable steady state which falls short from the voluntary
Writing (26) as an implicit function,
(28) p(a,b,r





) ps = -Rss(s)BE(0) + 2b)0
pr=BE(0))0
First, the higher the reservation price, i.e. the higher the costs of substituting the
environmental resource completely, the higher is the steady-state-stock which
determines a negative marginal yield. This condition may be not obvious in
contemporary approaches which rely on a low compensation price level and trap into
rising prices only very slowly. Second, it is not amazing that a large b increases the
chances of a stable steady state because a b approaching infinity changes the demand
curve into an horizontal line of fixed prices. Third, it seems surprising that a low
discount rate increases the chances of a stock which meets condition (27). But (27) is
only fulfilled if the exploitation of imperfections demands a stock which falls short
from the voluntary one. Therefore, a lower discount rate increases the voluntary steady
state stock and thereby increases the chances of instability.
The phase diagram of dominant imperfections is given in Figure 3. It demonstrates the
instability which accompanies (27). According to (25) and the assumptions of (5), the
e-function can possess an inflection point and must exhibit an infinitely negative slope
when the stock approaches zero. Additionally, one can easily show that tr(j) = r,|/|)0
holds. I refrain from interpreting the phase diagram extensively because no degree of
extractions exists which leads to the steady state for any given initial stock. The12
resource-owner is inevitably entrapped into an insolvable conflict which cannot be
cured-on the decision basis which this model has assumed.
<Figure 3 about here>
This section has shown that imperfections do not merely lead to a lower degree of
environmental services. Moreover, they are likely to induce serious compatibility
problems between the extraction-driven and the compensation-driven stock policies.
Neglecting the issue of imperfections and relying on a sufficient workability of
compensation policies could therefore result in severe complications if the reservation
price is very high and the resource owners are more patient than expected. Hence,
committing absolutely credibly to a fixed compensation price policy turns out as a
crucial prerequisite to compensate successfully for the maintenance of a stock which
produces environmental services.
5. Conclusions
This paper has questioned the advantages of compensating for global environmental
services on a steady basis when compensations try to maintain an environmental stock.
It has shown that serious complications can arise if the resource-owning countries are
few in number and the reservation price of the donator is very high. In that case,
extraction-driven stock preservation policies can conflict with compensation-driven
ones. This feature may be non-observable today but can turn out as a severe
complication in managing globally beneficial resource stocks in the long run. Whether
f compensation policies can neglect this aspect depends crucially on the credibility of
sticky compensation prices. Hence, the design of international organizations is not
merely a subordinate matter but decides crucially on the long-run success of monetary
compensation policies. Any institutional deficiency of organizing compensations may
endanger the success and even the stability of international environmental policies. But
whether the donators can credibly stick to a fixed compensation price is not only a
matter of the institutional setting but depends basically on the donators' intertemporal
performance. If the donators are represented by the countries' governments, the agents
revaluating compensation policies change in the course of time. This change renders a
credible commitment more difficult.
1
2
When the institutional design of compensation policies calls for sophisticated
mechanisms, project support may be a good alternative when preservation policies is
felt as an urgent task. Project support ensures a direct control of the donator on the use
See for the decisive role of a player's attributes GOTH (1990).13.
InsHtufs f "f r Welfwirtschofl
of a part of the environmental resource. E.g., project support financed by the World
Bank or the Global Environmental Facilities implies the management of the resource
use by the donator. Where compensations leave the property rights untouched, project
support changes the ownership structure. Hence, project support can compensate its
higher administrative costs by directly saving an essential part of the resource for the
donator and providing compensations for resource-owning countries. Thus, project
support may be at least a good starting point for international environmental policies.14
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Figure 1: Base Case without Compensations
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Figure 3: The Intertemporal Adjustment in the Case of a Variable Compensation
Price and Dominant Imperfections